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2The financial crisis of 2007–2009 had a major impact on individual investors’ wealth. Several
months of the crisis featured double-digit negative stock market returns, almost halving
investor portfolio values within the time period for which we have data available (April 2008
to March 2009). This dramatic shock to investor wealth combined with the high uncertainty
and high volatility of the market may have induced individual investors to radically change
their perception of the stock market and/or their own investment behavior (Hudomiet, Kézdi,
and Willis 2011), and may even have led them to shy away from equity investing (Bucher-
Koenen and Ziegelmeyer 2011). Ultimately, the recent shock to financial market returns may
have permanently lowered the rate of households’ stock market participation (Malmendier
and Nagel 2011), leading to possible future welfare losses (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
2005). Surprisingly, however, while numerous studies contribute to understanding the crisis’
causes and consequences for housing and securitization markets (Demyanyk and Van Hemert
2010; Foote et al. 2008; Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010), financial institutions (Shin 2009;
Wagner 2010), households (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010), and institutional investors (Anand et
al. 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Longstaff 2010), far less is known about how the
financial crisis affected individual investors’ perceptions, behavior, and performance.
We fill this gap in the literature by examining the perceptions, behavior, and
performance of individual investors during the recent financial crisis and investigating their
interaction over time. Our research objective is threefold. First, we aim to investigate how the
perceptions as well as the trading and risk-taking behavior of individual investors evolved
over the course of the crisis. Second, we want to understand how the dynamics, or month-to-
month revision, of investors’ perceptions are linked to their behavior, and how this behavior
subsequently affects investment performance. Third, we intend to discover what distinguishes
3outperforming investors from underperforming investors during the height of the crisis
(September–October 2008). We analyze whether there is persistence in these investors’
perceptions, behavior, and performance, identify the factors to which their success can be
related, and investigate the extent to which these dramatic months and the resulting
heterogeneity in investment performance had a feedback effect on investor perceptions and
behavior.
We exploit a unique panel of individual Dutch investors. For each month between April
2008 and March 2009 we measure these investors’ perceptions in a survey on their
expectations of stock market returns, their risk attitudes, and their risk perceptions.1 In
addition, we collect information on these investors’ trading behavior and performance through
their brokerage records and match this information to the survey data. The sample period
corresponds exactly with the time during which worldwide stock markets were hit hardest and
featured both large negative returns and high volatility. It includes major crisis events such as
the Lehman Brothers collapse and AIG bailout. During this time, the Dutch stock market
experienced four of the five worst monthly returns since January 2007 (when the crisis first
started to unfold; see Brunnermeier (2009)). For the S&P 500, this time period includes all
five of the worst months.
The results of this study show that investor perceptions exhibit significant fluctuation
over the sample period, with risk attitudes and risk perceptions being less volatile than return
expectations. During the height of the market turbulence— September–October 2008— we
observe a sharp increase in the fraction of investors trading, their turnover, and buy-sell ratios.
1 Throughout this paper, whenever we do not specifically refer to either return expectations, risk attitudes, or risk
perceptions, the term “perceptions” is used to refer to all of these survey variables in a general way to set them
apart from the trading and risk-taking behavior as inferred from this study’s brokerage record data.
4The levels and dynamics (monthly revisions) of investor perceptions are linked to their
trading and risk-taking behavior and thus contribute to explaining investment performance in
the crisis. Regarding trading behavior, we find that investors with higher levels and upward
revisions of return expectations were more likely to trade and to have higher turnover.
Furthermore, investors with higher levels of and upward revisions in their risk attitudes (they
were and became less risk averse) were more likely to trade and had higher buy-sell ratios.
Finally, investors with higher levels of risk perception and upward revisions therein were
more likely to trade, had a higher turnover, and had a lower buy-sell ratio. Regarding risk-
taking behavior, we find that investors who had lower return expectations, that were more risk
averse, and that had higher levels of and upward revisions in their risk perceptions chose
portfolios with lower risk. Overall, outperforming investors were characterized by high return
expectations and high risk aversion. Compared to less successful investors, they had lower
turnover, took less risk, traded less in derivatives, and had lower buy-sell ratios. Investors
who performed well during the height of the crisis (September–October 2008) also performed
better before and had higher return expectations during this very volatile period, but became
less risk averse in the following months. Subsequently, these investors no longer
outperformed and were no longer less likely to trade, suggesting that their success made them
overconfident. That is, performing relatively well during extreme times characterized by
overall negative market returns, high uncertainty, high volatility, and very salient events such
as bank failures, may lead investors to overestimate their investment skills.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, prior research suggests a
relationship between investors’ trading and risk-taking behavior and their return expectations
or optimism (Baker and Wurgler 2006; Baker and Wurgler 2007; Dorn 2009; Hirshleifer and
5Shumway 2003; Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 2003), as well as their risk attitudes and risk
perceptions (Dorn and Huberman 2005; Weber and Milliman 1997; Weber, Weber, and Nosic
2010). However, extant work often proxies for the effect of these factors on individual
investors’ behavior by assessing their effect on overall stock market returns or hypothetical
(survey-based) choices and subsequently making inferences about unobserved individual-
level behavior. In contrast, we examine the direct relationship between investor perceptions
and individual investors’ actual trading and risk-taking behavior. The use of a real decision
context is an important distinction of this research as hypothetical choices and risks are likely
to be treated differently by investors than real choices and risks (Slovic 1969). Consequently,
the results of hypothetical choice experiments may not generalize outside of the lab
(Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Perner 2002). Second, existing research often
investigates return expectations, risk attitudes, and risk perceptions in isolation while we
study their joint effect on investor behavior. Third, instead of using rather crude measures
such as the weather or consumer confidence to proxy for individual stock market participants’
expectations, we use psychometrically valid methods to accurately measure these factors on
an individual level (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Fourth, this research goes beyond a static,
cross-sectional observation of one of the aforementioned relationships, and is, instead, a
dynamic, longitudinal study of their joint effects in time of a major financial crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the data. Section II sets out
descriptive results on the dynamics of individual investor perceptions over time, their trading
and risk-taking behavior, as well as their returns. Section III links the dynamics of investors’
perceptions to their trading and risk-taking behavior as well as their performance. Section IV
6focuses on the most turbulent months of the crisis and identifies feedback effects of investors’
performance on their perceptions and behavior. Section V summarizes and concludes.
I. Data
We base the analyses on the brokerage records of a sample of 1,510 clients of the largest
online discount broker in the Netherlands and on matching monthly questionnaire data that
we collected for these clients from April 2008 until March 2009. The broker is called a
“discount broker” because it provides no investment advice. Using a discount broker ensures
that the survey responses reflect investors’ own decision making and opinions and not those
of an investment advisor. Discount brokers are the dominant channel through which both U.S.
and Dutch individuals invest (Barber and Odean 2000; Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz
2009), allowing us to collect a representative sample. As in Bauer et al. (2009), we exclude
accounts owned by minors (age <18 years) and accounts with an average end-of-month value
(within the sample period) of less than €250 (including cash). Furthermore, we limit the
sample to accounts owned by individual investors. To exclude professional traders, we
discard accounts in the top 1% of annual trading volume, number of transactions, or turnover
distributions. Finally, we exclude accounts that have zero investment portfolio balances over
the entire sample period. Imposing these criteria leaves 1,376 individual accounts for
investigation.
A. Brokerage Records and Capital Market Data
Complete brokerage records are available for all investors who completed at least one
monthly survey during the sample period. A “record” consists of an identification number,
7transaction date and time, buy/sell indicator, type of asset traded, gross transaction value, and
transaction commissions. The records also contain information on investors’ daily account
balances as well as sociodemographics, such as age, gender, and risk profile. Table II shows
descriptive statistics of all brokerage accounts available as well as those for the subset of
brokerage accounts belonging to clients who responded to the survey in each particular month
of the sample period. All variables are defined in Table I.
[Tables I-II here]
Comparison with samples used in other studies of individual investor behavior in the United
States (Barber and Odean 2000), Germany (Dorn and Huberman 2005) and the Netherlands
(Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009) shows that the sample of this study is similar with
regard to key characteristics, although trading activity is higher, especially compared to the
U.S.  samples.  These  U.S.  samples,  however,  were  collected  before  the  advent  of  online
trading platforms for individual investors and the associated higher frequency of trading (cf.
Bailey, Kumar, and Ng 2010). Comparing the average account value of the surveyed investors
to the average account value of €50,000–60,000 for Dutch investors in general (Bauer,
Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009) suggests that the investors in this sample invest more than
three-fourths of their total self-managed investment portfolio at this particular online broker.
Although we have no direct information on these investors’ total wealth, which would
include, for example, real estate ownership or pension accounts, these numbers make it
unlikely that this study examines “play” accounts (Goetzmann and Kumar 2008). Over 40%
of the survey respondents hold an investment account only with this particular broker. Of the
8respondents who also have accounts with other brokers, more than 50% indicate that the other
account(s) comprise(s) less than half their total investment portfolio. In addition to the
reported results, we ran all analyses separately for investors who invest only at this broker and
those who do not, but found no significant differences. To relate individual investors’
perceptions and trading behavior to overall stock market developments, we use return data
from  DataStream.  As  there  is  no  capital  gains  tax  under  the  Dutch  tax  system,  this  study’s
data and results are not affected by tax-loss selling motivated trading.
B. Survey Data
At the end of each month between April 2008 and March 2009, we designed and conducted a
survey among a panel of the online broker’s clients.  To develop this panel,  we first  sent an
invitation to participate to 20,000 randomly selected clients via email in March 2008. Six
months  later,  a  re-invitation  was  sent  to  all  initially  invited  clients  so  as  to  maintain  a
sufficient  response  rate.  There  were  856  clients  who responded to  the  first  questionnaire  of
April 2008. The resulting response rate of 4.28% is in line with (but slightly lower than)
comparable large-scale surveys (cf. Dorn and Sengmueller 2009), considering that we asked
the clients to participate for 12 consecutive months, requiring a substantial commitment and
effort. Including the respondents who joined the panel after April 2008, 1,510 clients
answered at least one questionnaire, with an average of 539 clients answering each month,
and a minimum of 296. Regarding willingness to respond regularly, 319 (43) clients
responded at least 6 (12) consecutive times. To assure a reliable measurement of the survey
variables,  we  limit  the  analyses  to  investors  who took  at  least  five  minutes  to  complete  the
9survey, and may thus be assumed to have seriously answered (Deutskens et al. 2004). The
lower panel of Table II shows monthly response numbers.
A possible concern with samples of investors such as the one used in this study is that
monthly variation of non-response by certain investors might not be random. It could be
argued, for example, that it is the especially successful or, alternatively, unsuccessful,
investors who are more likely to respond. Such response behavior could distort the inferences
we make from the data. The Appendix contains an analysis of this possibility and shows that
this study’s sample is unlikely to be subject to such problems.
The survey elicited information on investors’ perceptions of expected stock market
returns, their risk attitudes, and their risk perceptions for the upcoming month (see Table III).
To ensure a valid and reliable measurement of these variables, we utilize tested and well-
established measures from the psychometric literature (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Return
expectations reflect how optimistic a respondent is about her investment portfolio and its
returns in the upcoming month. Return expectations were measured in line with Segerstrom et
al. (1998) and Weber, Weber, and Nosic (2010). Risk attitude reflects a respondent’s general
predisposition toward financial risk (Pennings and Wansink 2004) and indicates the investor’s
like or dislike of risky situations. Risk attitude was measured following Pennings and Smidts
(2000). Risk perception reflects a respondent’s interpretation of how risky the stock market
will be in the upcoming month and was measured according to Pennings and Wansink (2004).
To ensure a reliable and valid measurement instrument, we used multiple items to
measure each survey variable, included these items in the questionnaire in a random order
(Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma 2003), and used a mixture of regular and reverse-scored
items (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). The reliability of the measurement instrument is high;
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Cronbach’s alpha is between 0.71–0.89 for the different survey variables (Hair et al. 1998).
One-factor solutions of exploratory factor analyses confirm the variables’ convergent validity.
Additional factor analyses show that cross-loadings between the different survey variables are
either low or insignificant, confirming their discriminant validity (Nunnally and Bernstein
1994). In line with Dillon and McDonald (2001), the survey variables are computed by
equally weighting and averaging their respective item scores. This type of variables perform
at least as well as those employing “optimally” weighted scores using factor analysis, but




In  this  section,  we  address  the  first  research  objective,  that  is,  we  examine  how  individual
investors’ trading behavior, risk taking, investment returns, and perceptions evolved over the
course of the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
A. Investor Trading Behavior, Risk-Taking Behavior, and Returns
Figures 1–5 show a number of key indicators of investors’ trading behavior, risk-taking
behavior, and returns during the sample period, and relate these to the returns and volatility of
the Dutch stock market index AEX.
[Figures 1-5 here]
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The share of investors that trade during the sample period, as well as their turnover, varies
over time (Figure 1), with a clear and sharp increase in both measures during the height of the
crisis (September–October 2008). During these months, buying volume increases and is larger
than selling volume (Figure 2). In line with the findings of Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008)
for normal stock market periods, this study’s sample of investors on average increased their
buying volume after price decreases (and vice-versa). That is, during the market turbulence,
individual investors entered the market when prices appeared to be depressed. Similar
behavior is found during the crisis for individual investors in China (Wang 2010).
Following Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009), we distinguish two measures for
investor monthly returns. First, we calculate returns based on their “complete portfolio,” that
is, the overall value of the brokerage account (including cash). Second, we calculate returns
based on their “risky portfolio,” that is, the invested share of the overall account value. Both
measures consider transaction costs and portfolio in- and outflows and closely resemble
market returns (Figure 3). These findings suggest that on average this study’s sample of
investors is not able to consistently outperform by entering or leaving the stock market.
Investors’ realized monthly complete and risky portfolio return volatilities closely track
that of the market (AEX), with the volatility of the risky portfolio being higher than the
market volatility (Figure 4). The higher buy compared to sell volumes are thus not due to
investors reducing portfolio risk, but indicate a desire to maintain risky asset exposure even
during the financial crisis. Especially in September–October 2008, investors’ average
complete and risky portfolio volatility spikes and continues to exceed the market’s volatility
(Figure 4). Thus, in contrast to the findings of Wang (2010) for Chinese individual investors’
trading behavior and those of Weber, Weber, and Nosic (2010) for a choice experiment with
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U.K. individual investors, on average Dutch individual investors continued investing in risky
assets during the financial crisis. Figure 5 confirms this result and shows the risky share, that
is, the fraction of the total account value that is invested. Fluctuations in the risky share follow
the market return, but are less volatile. These smaller fluctuations (of generally riskier
portfolios than the market) suggest partial rebalancing of the risky share as investors’ relative
exposure to risky assets changed after market movements (cf. Calvet et al. 2009).
B. Investor Perceptions
Figures 6 and 7 show the evolution of investors’ return expectations, risk attitudes, and risk
perceptions during the crisis and the returns of the Dutch stock market index AEX.
[Figures 6-7 here]
Individual investors’ return expectations (measured at the end of each month) seem to be
closely linked with past market returns (Figure 6). Consistent with earlier studies using survey
data obtained from a panel of Dutch households in April 2004 and in April 2006 (Hurd, van
Rooij, and Winter 2011), our longitudinal research design shows that return expectations
appear to be influenced by recent stock market developments. This finding is also in line with
results obtained from the Survey of Economic Expectations in 1999–2001 and the Michigan
Survey of Consumers in 2002–2004 (Dominitz and Manski 2011), which indicate that
American households’ expectations of equity returns are often based on the belief that recent
stock market performance will persist into the near future. Our results extend these earlier
findings by showing that the relationship between return expectations and market returns not
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only holds for households in general (that may or may not invest in the stock market), but also
holds for a sample of self-directed individual investors and during very volatile market phases
such as experienced during the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
We find similar effects for risk attitude and risk perception, although in line with recent
literature these measures display less fluctuation over the sample period (Bateman et al. 2010;
Sahm 2007; Weber, Weber, and Nosic 2010). Regarding risk attitudes, this study’s findings
extend those of Bateman et al. (2010) and Weber, Weber, and Nosic (2010) by having a
longitudinal research design with more frequent measurement thereby allowing to examine
changes in risk attitudes during the course of the financial crisis. While this study’s results are
similar to those obtained by Weber, Weber, and Nosic (2010) for the same months
investigated in their U.K.-based survey (August 2008, November 2008, and February 2009),
we find more significant changes from month to month with our longitudinal research design
that includes a more frequent measurement of the survey variables of interest.2 Indeed, our
results are similar in that risk attitude increases significantly from August 2008 to November
2008, whereas, as in Weber, Weber, and Nosic (2010), the change from November 2008 to
February 2009 is statistically insignificant. However, before and in between these three-
month measurement intervals, this study’s monthly survey detects further time-variation in
risk attitude (Figure 7). As risk attitudes and changes therein are an important driver of
investors’ behavior and can also be linked to their performance during the financial crisis (see
Sections IV and V), a frequent measurement of investor perceptions provides additional
2 Our results cannot be compared with those of Bateman et al. (2010), since risk tolerance in their study is
inferred from two data points, March 2007 and October 2008, the first of which falls outside our sample period.
14
insight into their dynamics during times of severe market turbulence that are more difficult to
identify when investigating longer time intervals.
III. How Investors’ Perceptions Drive Trading Behavior, Risk Taking, and Performance
The previous analyses illustrated that investor perceptions, trading behavior, and risk taking
vary from month to month on an investor-averaged basis, while they are linked to each other
through variations in market return. Here, we address the second research objective by
examining how the underlying time variation in investors’ perceptions drive their trading
behavior, risk taking, and investment performance. To do so, we use panel regressions in
which investor perceptions are included as explanatory variables in their one-month lagged
levels and changes (revisions) from that month to infer how perceptions at the start of a month
(i.e., end of the previous month) subsequently influence current behavior and performance.
A. Investor Perceptions and Trading Behavior
Table IV presents results on investors’ market participation (having traded or not), turnover,
average trade size, and buy-sell ratio. Whereas the first two indicators refer to investors’
trading activity, the latter two refer to particular actions taken by investors when trading.
[Table IV here]
The probit regression results (first column in Table IV) confirm previous findings by showing
that investors are less likely to trade if they have more experience, as proxied by account
tenure (Dhar and Zhu 2006; Glaser and Weber 2007; Kumar 2009), whereas they are more
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likely to trade if they are either more sophisticated (trade in derivatives) or wealthier (Bauer,
Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009). Investor perceptions help explain the dynamics of investors’
market participation during the crisis and extend the findings of previous research. In
particular, investors are more likely to trade the higher both the levels and upward revisions of
their return expectations, risk attitude (less risk aversion), and risk perception.
For the subset of investors who traded, we confirm previous findings that being male
(Barber and Odean 2001), wealthy (Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009), and preferring
stock over cash dividends and thus possibly having a less risk-averse nature (Shefrin and
Statman 1984) increase turnover (second column in Table IV). In addition, we find that higher
levels of return expectations and risk perceptions as well as upward revisions thereto induce
higher turnover. Risk attitudes are not significantly linked to turnover once the decision
whether to trade or not is made.
As to average trade size, we find no evidence that investors with higher return
expectations trade larger amounts per transaction (third column in Table IV). Thus, during the
crisis, we cannot confirm a positive relationship between investor conviction and bet size
(Baks, Busse, and Green 2006; De Long et al. 1991). Rather, in times of market turmoil,
investors seem to be cautious about letting their expectations influence the size of their trades.
Concerning investors’ buy-sell ratios, we find that investors with higher levels of and
upward revisions in their risk attitudes (they are and become less risk averse), lower levels of
risk perceptions, less experience (shorter account tenure), and lower levels of sophistication
(no derivatives usage) have higher buy-sell ratios (fourth column in Table IV). This confirms
our expectation that less risk averse investors incur larger exposure to the market, while
investors who perceive higher risk lower their exposure. The sociodemographic controls
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suggest that more competent investors are less likely to make investment mistakes (cf.
Graham, Harvey, and Huang 2009), such as increasing their exposure in a falling market.
B. Investor Perceptions and Risk Taking
As  measures  of  investor  risk  taking,  we  first  use  the  risky  share,  and  second  the  standard
deviation of their daily returns (after considering transactions costs and portfolio in- and
outflows).3 Using risky share as the risk-taking measure confirms earlier findings that if
investors decide to trade (they had one or more transactions that month), and are less risk
averse (they prefer stock over cash dividend), they take on more risk (Barber and Odean
2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009) (Table V). Neither perceptions nor other factors found
previously in the literature explain the risky share.
[Table V here]
For the second risk measure, the standard deviation of investor returns, we look at the returns
on  the  complete  portfolio,  including  the  risky  share  as  a  control  variable  in  the  regression.
Now, in addition to the factors already identified in the risky share regression, other factors,
including perceptions, contribute to explain investors’ risk taking (Table V). Along with the
higher R2 of this regression, this highlights that using only the risky share as a measure of risk
may mask some details of the drivers of investor risk taking. This finding is reinforced by the
3 Due to data limitations regarding investors’ risky portfolio components, we cannot consider other measures of
risk taking such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that measures the degree of investor diversification. Detailed
portfolio data are available for only a subset of approximately 30% of our sample of investors. Based on this
subset we can construct the monthly average number of securities held by an investor as a crude diversification
measure. Results of analyses that include this diversification measure as a control variable are in line with both
the findings presented in this section and those analyzing Sharpe ratios in Subsection C of Section III.
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fact that the coefficient for the risky share is significant and positive, but is not the only factor
that explains the risk of the complete portfolio. Thus, unlike for the Swedish investor sample
of Calvet et al. (2009), where investors almost exclusively used adjustments of the risky share
to steer the complete portfolio risk, we find that additional factors, possibly related to the
composition of the risky portfolio, are important determinants of the overall portfolio risk.
We confirm previous findings that investors who are more experienced (longer account
tenure) and sophisticated (derivatives usage) take on more risk (Barber and Odean 2001;
Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009), whereas wealthier
investors  (higher  complete  portfolio  value)  take  less  risk  (Table  V).  The  latter  finding  may
appear surprising from a standard finance perspective, but is intuitive from a behavioral
viewpoint: wealthier investors no longer need to take on high risk to achieve financial
independence or may better understand and hence be less willing to take risk (Shefrin 2002).
Table V also shows that studying the dynamics of investor perceptions together with
observable account and investor characteristics improves the understanding of investor risk
taking, as levels of return expectations and risk attitude, and both level of and revisions in risk
perception determine risk taking. With respect to risk attitudes, we find the intuitive result that
higher past levels of risk attitude (less risk aversion) lead to higher portfolio standard
deviations. The return expectation and risk perception coefficient signs, however, seem
puzzling: lower return expectations and higher risk perceptions lead to higher portfolio risk.
However, this relationship is in line with the behavioral finding that individual investors
expect to earn higher returns from safer stocks (Shefrin 2001), implying a negative
relationship between return expectations and portfolio risk. Indeed, there is a strongly
significant negative relationship when regressing investor return expectations on risk
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perceptions (b = –0.17, p < 0.001). That is, decreasing risk perception seems to be equated
with expecting higher returns, which, in turn, leads investors to hold safer portfolios. The
perception regression coefficients are small, but economically significant, as we examine
monthly standard deviations. For example, increasing the past level of risk perception by one
on its seven-point scale increases the annualized standard deviation by almost five percentage
points.
C. Investor Perceptions and Performance
We  first  investigate  returns  on  the  complete  portfolios  and  subsequently  account  for
heterogeneity in investment risk by analyzing Sharpe ratios. Again, we first confirm prior
findings (Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009) that complete portfolio value positively, and
derivatives usage and low risk aversion (preference for stock over cash dividend) negatively,
affect performance. Also, higher turnover leads to lower returns (Barber and Odean 2000).
[Table VI here]
Table VI reveals that, once again, in addition to observable account and investor
characteristics, the dynamics of investor perceptions are important in explaining investor
returns. In particular, higher levels and upward revisions in levels of return expectations are
associated with higher returns, while higher levels of risk attitude (investors are less risk
averse) and higher risk perception are associated with lower returns. Since we control for
various measures of trading and risk-taking behavior in this regression (and thus the effect of
perceptions on these determinants of investment returns), additional effects, for example,
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variation in portfolio compositions, must play a role. We cannot investigate such effects in
detail due to data limitations with respect to the portfolio holdings, which are only available
for approximately 30% of the investors in this study’s sample.
However, we can control for investors’ past returns to check whether it is only good
(and persistent) past performance that leads to high current performance and thus possibly
increasing return expectations. We find that the positive effect of return expectations remains
significant (second column in Table VI). However, when removing the change in return
expectations coefficient from the regression model, the coefficient for past month’s level of
return expectation becomes insignificant, whereas removing past month’s level neither
substantially changes the significance of the change in the return expectations coefficient nor
its size. This seems to suggest that the observed effect of return expectations on performance
stems from reverse causality: high return performance leads to higher return expectations.4
As a risk-adjusted performance measure that accounts for individual investors’
imperfect diversification we calculate the Sharpe ratios of this study’s sample of investors.
Following DeMiguel et al. (2010), we calculate the Sharpe ratio as investors’ monthly return
divided by its standard deviation (without considering the risk-free benchmark). In line with
Israelsen (2005), we calculate the modified Sharpe ratio for investor i in month t as follows:
(1)
This modification is important in this sample period of severe market turbulence, since it
results in meaningful rankings of investors even in times of mostly negative market returns.
4 For all other regression models we examine whether including lags or, alternatively, changes of perceptions has
an effect. The results confirmed that in all other models, perceptions in their lagged levels and/or changes have
an influence on investor behavior.
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That is, given a certain negative return r, an investor’s performance ranking becomes worse
with an increasing standard deviation (while for the classical Sharpe ratio, the opposite holds).
The regression of the modified Sharpe ratio on investor perceptions and a set of control
variables shows that over the sample period, high risk-adjusted performance is significantly
related to high past levels and upward revisions of return expectations and low levels and
negative revisions of risk attitudes (i.e., high and increasing risk aversion), while risk
perceptions have no effect (Table VII). Note that the results are robust to controlling for past
month’s Sharpe ratio (second column in Table VII). Coefficient magnitudes are economically
significant, as the Sharpe ratio is measured in monthly terms.
[Table VII here]
In the regressions results of Table VII we explicitly control for investor trading behavior
(turnover), average trade size, the risky share, and the buy-sell ratio. The only remaining
channels through which perceptions influence the Sharpe ratio are investor returns and their
risk-taking behavior. Tables IV and V confirm this, showing a positive relationship of return
expectations with investor returns, and a negative relationship with investment risk taken.
Both effects lead to an increased Sharpe ratio. Risk attitudes and risk perceptions have an
opposite association with investment risk and returns and thus affect the Sharpe ratio in an
inverse manner.5 In terms of behavior, successful investors had lower turnover, took less risk,
traded less in derivatives, and had lower buy-sell ratios than less successful investors.
5 An insignificant coefficient for risk perception in the Sharpe ratio regression shows that the Sharpe ratio is not
merely picking up information on return volatility but also on investor returns. If the Sharpe ratio picked up
information only from return volatilities, which could be the case when differences in volatilities are more
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Overall, the analyses in this section reveal that the dynamics (levels as well as month-
to-month revisions thereto) of individual investors’ perceptions are significantly related to
their trading behavior, risk-taking behavior, and performance and have explanatory power
over and beyond investor characteristics that can be inferred from brokerage records alone.
IV. Overconfidence and Performance During Times of Severe Market Turbulence
In this section we address the third and final research objective of this study by examining the
determinants of investor performance during times of severe market turbulence and related
feedback effects on perceptions and behavior. We sort investors according to their
performance (modified Sharpe ratio) during the two months with the most dramatic stock
market developments in our sample period as well as during the entire financial crisis:
September and October 2008. Our intent is to discover whether and, if so, how the most
successful investors differ from other investors in terms of observable account and investor
characteristics, perceptions, and trading and risk-taking behavior. This analysis sheds some
light on whether success during the height of the crisis was due to “luck,” personal (fixed)
characteristics and behavior already present before (and after) this dramatic period
(“strategy”), or a timely and appropriate adaptation of behavior and strategies during these
two  months  (“tactics”)  that  may  also  persist  outside  these  months  (“skill”).  Based  on  the
results  of  this  analysis,  we  finally  examine  to  what  extent  these  dramatic  months  and  the
resulting heterogeneity in investment performance had a feedback effect on investor
perceptions and behavior.
persistent between investors than differences in returns, we would expect a significant negative coefficient for
risk perception (compare Table V), which is not the case (Table VI), adding to the robustness of our findings.
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A. Descriptive Results
Figure 8 presents investors’ modified Sharpe ratios according to the September–October 2008
ranking (investors are sorted into performance quintiles) for the pre September–October
period (April to August 2008), the September–October 2008 period, and the period after
September–October (November 2008 to March 2009).6
[Figure 8 here]
The modified Sharpe ratio quintiles in September–October 2008 are monotonically increasing
(by construction), while before and after this period they are not. In these before and after
periods, the quintile bars are hump-shaped. Some of the most successful investors during
September–October are somewhere in the middle ranks before and after this period. This
suggests that there is no strong performance persistence due to superior skills, at least not
among the best-performing investor quintiles. However, there does appear to be persistent
investor underperformance: investors in the lowest quintile in September–October also have
the lowest performance before and after this period (cf. Carhart 1997).
Figure 9 shows how successful investors differ from less successful investors in terms
of turnover, likelihood to trade, buy-sell ratio, and risky share.
[Figure 9 here]
With respect to trading activity, that is, the fraction of investors that traded and their turnover,
the most successful investors in September–October 2008 are not among the investors with
6 Sorting investors into deciles or quartiles leads to similar results.
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the lowest trading activity (Panels A and B of Figure 9). We find a u-shape in trading activity
over the performance quintile bars that mirrors quite well the hump-shape of investor
performance before and after the September–October period (Figure 8). That is, outside the
September–October period, performance is decreasing in trading activity and investors that
were successful in September–October have average turnover and performance. Hence, it
could be that investors identified as successful in September–October achieved their success
by pure luck. However, we find further differences in their behavior during as well as outside
these months that suggests otherwise. Figure 9 shows that the risky share is always lowest for
the investors who are successful in September–October 2008, making them less vulnerable to
the severe market downturn (Panel D). Since this characteristic holds over the entire sample
period, it suggests a difference in investment strategy that turned out to be especially
beneficial during September–October 2008. Moreover, successful investors had the lowest
buy-sell ratio in September–October, but not outside this period, which provides some
evidence for a successful timing-the-market tactic (Panel C).
[Figure 10 here]
Figure 10 shows investor perceptions according to the September–October performance
ranking.7 Within the September–October period, investment success is increasing in return
expectations (Panel A of Figure 10), there are no clear tendencies in risk attitude (Panel B),
and risk perceptions are decreasing to a slight u-shape (Panel C). Before and after this period,
7 We  center  the  data  prior  to  averaging  the  survey  items  over  the  different  subperiods.  As  the  panel  is  not
balanced, mere averaging would put more emphasis on high response months with particularly high or low
perception scores on the survey variables.
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this univariate analysis finds no clear pattern with respect to perceptions, with the exception
that the most successful investors in September–October 2008 continue to have the highest
return expectations and lowest risk perception in the following months.
[Table VIII here]
Table VIII summarizes the investor characteristics discussed so far. In addition, this table
shows that successful investors are more likely to be male, have higher complete portfolio
values, and have higher average trade sizes over the entire sample period.
B. Regression Analyses
We now analyze the September–October performance in a multivariate setting. We run three
regressions models. In each model, the dependent variable is the September–October 2008
mean performance (modified Sharpe ratio). The values of the independent variables, however,
refer to one of the three respective subperiods (April–August 2008, September–October 2008,
and November 2008–March 2009). Note that this changes the interpretation of the results. For
example, when we regress September–October 2008 performance on a set of explanatory
variables over the period November 2008 to March 2009, we are able to identify by which
characteristics investors that were successful in September–October 2008 differed from less
successful investors in the period November 2008 to March 2009.
As the dependent variable no longer has time variation, we remove the time dimension
from the independent variables. For each regression, we average the values of the monthly
realizations of independent variables, except those that are fixed over time (e.g., gender).
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Indicator variables (e.g., Traded, indicating whether an investor traded in a certain month)
now refer to percentages (e.g., the percentage of months an investor traded).
[Table IX here]
Table IX presents regression results including perceptions, time-invariant (fixed) investor
characteristics, trading behavior, and performance indicators for each of the three subperiods.
Overall, this multivariate setting confirms the previous univariate results. With respect to
performance persistence, achieving success in September–October is positively related to
having achieved success in the preceding subperiod (first column in Table IX), but has no
effect on subsequent subperiod success (third column in Table IX). For investors that were
successful in September–October 2008, the likelihood of trading is significantly lower both
before and during this period, while afterward, successful investors are no longer less likely to
trade than less successful investors. The same holds for the frequency of trading derivatives:
investors that were successful in September–October 2008 were significantly less likely to
trade derivatives both before and during this period, but afterward they do no longer differ
from less successful investors in this regard. In all three subperiods, average trade size is
positively, and the risky share is negatively, related to good September–October performance,
confirming a persistent difference in behavior between successful investors and their less
successful peers. For none of the subperiods do we find a significant relationship between
turnover  and  the  buy-sell  ratio  and  September–October  performance.  With  respect  to  fixed
investor characteristics, we do not find a significant gender effect. Having a higher complete
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portfolio value is significantly and positively related to September–October performance in
all three subperiods.
Again, investor perceptions shed additional light on the drivers of the performance of
successful investors during the financial crisis. Before the September–October 2008
subperiod, the perceptions of investors that were successful in September–October do not
differ significantly from those of less successful investors. During this period, however,
investor return expectations are positively related to success. On the one hand, this could be
taken as further evidence of a possible feedback effect but, on the other hand, as the
regressions in Section IV show, high return expectations are related to lower risk taking,
which turned out to be an especially beneficial course of action during the time of severe
market turbulence. This effect is confirmed when examining investor risk perceptions. The
coefficient is negative in the September–October period, although not significant (however, it
is  jointly  significant  with  return  expectations  at  the  1% level).  As  the  results  in  Section  IV
showed, lower risk perception is related to lower risk taking. After the September–October
period, when we do not find performance persistence, the return expectations and risk
perceptions of investors that were successful in September–October also do no longer differ
significantly from those of less successful investors. Interestingly, achieving success in
September–October 2008 is related to having a significantly higher risk attitude after this
period while there is no persistence in outperformance, which suggests that achieving success
in times of severe crisis may lead investors to become more convinced of their investment
skills and thus more willing to take and accept (uncompensated) risk (see e.g., Barber and
Odean 2002). The earlier finding that investors that were successful in September–October
2008 were less likely to trade in general and in derivatives in particular both before and
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during this period, but afterward do no longer differ from unsuccessful investors in this
regard, reinforces the notion that the success of these investors led to overconfidence. That is,
we find a feedback effect of investment success on risk attitude (less risk aversion), which is
linked to particular changes in trading behavior that negatively affect performance (trading in
general and in derivatives in particular). This finding reinforces and extends the “learning to
be overconfident” hypothesis (Gervais and Odean 2001) and predictions of prospect theory
(Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001; Barberis and Xiong 2009; Liu et al. 2010).
The results of Section V show that achieving success during the height of the financial
crisis is related to a combination of fixed investor characteristics and behavior (strategy) and,
possibly, luck, but not necessarily to successful tactical investment behavior or skills.
However, as the sample period available for a detailed performance attribution is short
compared to other studies, this finding should be interpreted with some caution. Most
importantly, this section’s results provide evidence that achieving success during times of
severe market turbulence may lead investors to become overconfident about their skills.
V. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we use a unique panel of individual investors to investigate the dynamic
interplay between investors’ perceptions, behavior, and performance during the financial
crisis of 2007–2009. Using matched survey and trading data, we find evidence that
information on individual investors’ perceptions improves our understanding of their trading
and risk-taking behavior and helps explain their investment performance during the worst
financial crisis in recent history.
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Average investor perceptions exhibit significant fluctuation over the sample period,
with risk attitudes and risk perceptions being less volatile than return expectations, but more
subject to change compared to the findings of studies conducted during normal times
(Pennings and Smidts 2000) or even compared to other studies examining the financial crisis
that  are  based  on  fewer  observations  than  this  study  (Weber,  Weber,  and  Nosic  2010).  In
addition, this study finds a sharp increase in the share of investors trading, their turnover, and
their buy-sell ratios during the height of the financial crisis (September–October 2008), when
Lehman Brothers collapsed and AIG was bailed out by the U.S. government.
Notably, both the levels and dynamics (monthly revisions) of investor perceptions are
linked to their trading and risk-taking behavior and contribute to explaining investment
performance. Regarding trading behavior, we find that investors with higher levels and
upward revisions of return expectations were more likely to trade and to have higher turnover.
Furthermore, investors with higher levels of and upward revisions in their risk attitudes (they
were and became less risk averse) were more likely to trade and had higher buy-sell ratios.
Finally, investors with higher levels of risk perception and upward revisions therein were
more likely to trade, had a higher turnover, and had a lower buy-sell ratio. Regarding risk-
taking behavior, we find that investors who had lower return expectations, that were more risk
averse, and that had higher levels of and upward revisions in their risk perceptions chose
portfolios with lower standard deviations.
Overall, successful investors during the crisis are characterized by high return
expectations and high risk aversion. In terms of behavior, successful investors had lower
turnover, took less risk, traded less derivatives, and had lower buy-sell ratios. Investors who
performed well during the height of the market turbulence (September–October 2008) also
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performed better in the months before and had higher return expectations during this very
volatile period, but became less risk averse in the following months. Subsequently, these
investors were no longer able to outperform their peers and were no longer less likely to trade,
suggesting that their earlier success may have made them overconfident (Gervais and Odean
2001). That is, performing relatively well during extreme times characterized by overall
negative market returns, high uncertainty, high volatility, and very salient events such as bank
failures, may have led investors to overestimate their investment skills (Moore and Healy
2008) and given them ill-founded illusions as to their knowledge and control (Barber and
Odean 2002). The results thus support and extend Gervais and Odean’s (2001) findings on the
“learning to be overconfident” hypothesis in times of a major financial crisis.
This study’s findings are of relevance to policymakers involved in crisis management.
Changes in investors’ perceptions over time are linked to changes in key behaviors, such as
trading frequency, turnover, and risk taking. Other research finds that individual investors’
trading behavior not only influences stock prices (Kumar and Lee 2006), but also shows that
their systematic behavioral biases may ultimately affect the macro-economy (Korniotis and
Kumar 2010). Therefore, frequent collection of information about investor perceptions could
be a crucial aspect of an early warning system designed to prevent overheating of the
financial market. Such information could be part of an integrative communication strategy
targeted at financial market participants with the aim of moderating their perceptions so as to
prevent destabilizing investment behavior that could put the entire financial system at risk. In
this regard, it may be especially fruitful to educate investors about how their perceptions
affect their trading and risk-taking behavior and the impact of this on both the risk and returns
of their investment portfolios (cf. Roszkowski and Davey 2010).
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Appendix
To examine whether this study’s sample is subject to non-random response behavior, we
compare for each month of the sample the characteristics of investors who responded to the
survey with those of the non-responding investors. Table X presents the mean differences
between respondents and non-respondents and indicates which ones are statistically
significant. To examine whether non-response is related to key aspects of investor behavior
and investment performance, we include in our comparison investor risk-taking (risky share,
portfolio standard deviation) and performance variables (return, modified Sharpe ratio), which
are defined and analyzed in detail in Sections III and IV of this paper. We also include a set of
investor demographics, including age, account tenure, and trading activity.
[Table X here]
Comparing the means of respondent and non-respondent characteristics shows that in some
months there are significant differences, especially with respect to age, account tenure, and
trading activity. In these months, respondents, compared to non-respondents, are older, have a
higher account tenure, and are more likely to trade, whereas their overall transaction volume
is smaller. There are almost no significant differences between the respondents and non-
respondents with respect to risk taking and performance. When comparing the occurrence of
months with significant differences between respondents and non-respondents with the
overall market performance (Figure 1), no clear patterns emerge that would indicate that non-
random response behavior is driven by overall market developments.
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To rule out any effects not identified by the visual inspection of mean differences, we
conduct a more rigorous test. We estimate for each of the 12 months a logit model where the
dependent variable indicates response (1) or non-response (0). As explanatory variables we
include the set of variables contained in Table X. Next, we calculate the predicted
probabilities of responding to the survey. Finally, we run all regression models considered in
this paper using the inverse of the predicted probabilities as sample weights, that is, we use an
inverse probability weighted estimator (Robins and Rotnitzky 1995; Wooldridge 2002). The
regression results using this estimator yield results similar to those obtained from the original
specifications in terms of coefficient magnitudes, significance, and signs (detailed results are
available from the authors upon request). Exceptions are the turnover regression (Section IV),
where, in line with Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009), we now identify a positive effect of
investor experience (account tenure) on turnover (b = 0.042, p = 0.039), and the modified
Sharpe ratio regression, where we find a small negative effect of age on performance (b = –
0.001, p = 0.040). We conclude that non-random response behavior is not a serious concern in
our sample and is unlikely to affect our results either qualitatively or quantitatively.
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This table defines the variables used in this study.
Variable Definition
Gender Indicator variable taking the value 0 for male investors and 1 for female investors.
Age Age of the investor in years as of April 2008.
Account Tenure Account tenure of the investor in years as of April 2008.
Risky Portfolio Part of the investors’ account value that is invested (i.e., excluding cash).
Complete Portfolio Risky portfolio plus cash.
Risky Share Risky portfolio divided by complete portfolio.
Sophisticated Indicator variable taking the value 1 if an investor traded an option or futures contract
at least once during the sample period or 0 otherwise.
Traded Indicator  variable  taking the  value  1  if  an  investor  traded in  a  particular  month  or  0
otherwise.
Trades Number of all executed transactions in a particular month.
Volume Sum of the absolute values of all purchases and sales in a particular month.
Turnover Volume divided by the average of the complete portfolio values at the beginning and
end of a particular month.
Dividend Choice Stock Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the investors’ preferred way to receive dividend
is stock dividend or 0 in case of a preference for cash dividend.
Dividend Choice Cash &
Stock
Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the investors’ preferred way to receive dividend
is stock dividend for one of her subaccounts and cash for another subaccount or 0 in
case of a preference for cash dividend for all her subaccounts.
Average Trade Size The investor’s monthly volume divided by her trades.
Buy-Sell Ratio Difference between volume buy and volume sell, normalized (divided) by volume. For
investors with no trades in a particular month, this ratio is set to zero (such investors
mimic an investor with equal buy and sell volume).
Return Monthly investor return given by the product of the daily relative changes in the value
of her complete portfolio or risky portfolio after transaction costs and portfolio in- and
outflows.
Modified Sharpe Ratio The investor’s modified Sharpe ratio in a particular month, calculated according to
Equation (1).
Return Expectation Reflects how optimistic a respondent is about her investment portfolio and its returns
in the upcoming month. Details on the survey questions are given in Table III.
Risk Attitude Reflects a respondent’s general predisposition toward financial risk.  Details  on  the
survey questions are given in Table III.
Risk Perception Reflects a respondent’s interpretation of how risky the stock market will be in the




This table presents monthly summary statistics for the brokerage account data. Panel A refers to all investors for whom brokerage records are available. This sample includes
the investors that participated at least once during the entire sample period in the survey, and that were not removed by the restrictions as defined in section I. The monthly
summary statistics presented in Panel B refer to the subset of the investors that responded to the survey in each respective month. Variables are defined in Table I.
Month Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
Investors N 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376
Gender 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Age mean 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43 50.43
Account Tenure mean 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24
Complete Portfolio Value € mean 68,714 69,747 62,946 61,199 63,508 52,044 44,090 41,756 41,824 41,344 38,194 38,426
Complete Portfolio Value € median 18,867 20,125 18,272 17,614 18,342 15,615 12,958 12,147 12,184 12,173 10,914 11,077
Fraction Sophisticated 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Fraction Traded 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.41 0.52 0.62 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.42
Trades (Traders) mean 8.55 7.54 7.78 9.37 7.27 8.77 10.72 8.84 7.78 9.75 8.81 9.87
Trades (Traders) median 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.50 4.00
Volume € (Traders) mean 44,960 30,037 32,271 35,696 30,554 40,147 50,787 30,986 22,489 28,349 25,918 29,414
Volume € (Traders) median 7,154 7,008 6,210 6,165 4,192 5,816 6,242 5,277 3,660 4,229 4,182 4,915
Turnover (Traders) mean 1.12 0.92 0.86 1.25 0.97 1.24 2.01 1.44 1.17 1.43 1.33 1.51
Turnover (Traders) median 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.43 0.31 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.32
Month Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
Investors N 788 702 607 557 525 493 646 398 325 308 268 291
Gender 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Age mean 50.35 50.98 51.26 51.62 52.51 52.35 51.40 52.21 52.61 52.72 53.86 53.21
Account Tenure mean 3.17 3.19 3.29 3.22 3.29 3.28 3.35 3.41 3.44 3.52 3.65 3.51
Complete Portfolio Value € mean 68,387 68,734 61,836 62,897 67,478 54,985 42,091 45,490 39,297 43,848 37,678 35,271
Complete Portfolio Value € median 19,350 21,046 20,370 18,769 21,764 17,716 13,909 14,410 15,133 15,754 14,971 13,157
Fraction Sophisticated 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.41
Fraction Traded 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.54 0.64 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.45
Trades (Traders) mean 9.17 7.07 7.99 8.46 6.74 8.67 10.99 8.72 6.99 10.42 10.13 9.70
Trades (Traders) median 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Volume € (Traders) mean 51,600 24,734 30,136 25,759 22,499 28,532 56,020 30,656 21,256 35,567 31,511 27,349
Volume € (Traders) median 7,325 6,025 6,420 6,354 4,011 5,981 6,962 5,322 3,567 4,785 3,595 6,271
Turnover (Traders) mean 1.30 0.86 0.98 1.14 0.72 1.00 2.24 1.76 0.95 1.19 1.46 2.01
Turnover (Traders) median 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.21 0.42 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.33
Panel B: Survey Respondents




This table presents the questions as used in this study’s 12 consecutive monthly surveys. A 7-point Likert scale is
used to record investors’ response to each question. Each survey variable (return expectation, risk attitude, risk
perception) is calculated as the equally weighted average of the respective survey questions. * denotes a reverse-
scored question. All survey variables are measured using psychometrically validated measurement scales
(Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Cronbach’s alpha is between 0.71–0.89 for all survey variables, indicating the
measurement instrument is reliable (Hair et al. 1998).
Survey Variable Answer Categories
Return Expectation (1 = low/pessimistic, 7 = high/optimistic)
This month my investments are doing less well than desired. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
My investment experiences of this month give me a positive
feeling about my financial future.*
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
This month my investments will have a worse performance than
those of most other investors.
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
This month it is unlikely that my investment behavior will lead to
positive returns.
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
This month the future of my investment portfolio looks good.* 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
Risk Attitude (1 = high risk aversion, 7 = low risk aversion)
When investing, I prefer financial certainty over uncertainty this
month.
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
Regarding investing, I prefer certainty over uncertainty this
month.
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
This month I avoid risks when investing. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
This month, I do not like to take financial risks. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
This month, I do not like to “play it safe.”* 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
Risk Perception (1 = low perceived risk, 7 = high perceived risk)
I consider investing to be very risky this month.* 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
I consider investing to be safe this month. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)
I consider investing to be dangerous this month. * 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree)




This table presents the results from regressions of several indicators of investor trading behavior on investor perceptions and a set of control variables. Dependent variables
referring to trading behavior are market participation (Traded), turnover, average trade size, and buy-sell ratio. The first column shows the results of a random effects panel
probit estimation for the dependent variable Traded, which indicates whether an investor traded in a particular month (1) or not (0). Reported are marginal effects at means (0)
of independent continuous (discrete dummy) variables. The other columns show results of linear panel models for the truncated sample of investors who have at least one
trade in a particular month. Standard errors are clustered on the investor level for all linear panel models. Variables are defined in Table I. *, **, *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Marg. Eff. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Return Expectation prev. month 0.101 0.019 *** 0.110 0.047 ** 0.575 0.534 -0.031 0.022
D Return Expectation 0.053 0.016 *** 0.095 0.036 *** 0.349 0.251 -0.033 0.020
Risk Attitude prev. month 0.084 0.015 *** 0.015 0.035 -0.114 0.393 0.062 0.017 ***
D Risk Attitude 0.069 0.013 *** -0.018 0.026 -0.032 0.161 0.064 0.016 ***
Risk Perception prev. month 0.027 0.013 ** 0.086 0.024 *** 0.250 0.210 -0.036 0.015 **
D Risk Perception 0.019 0.010 * 0.069 0.018 *** 0.170 0.173 -0.019 0.013
Gender 0.063 0.071 -0.197 0.085 ** -0.489 0.848 0.050 0.050
Age 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.003 ** -0.016 0.032 -0.001 0.001
Account Tenure -0.025 0.011 ** 0.025 0.018 -0.081 0.233 -0.017 0.009 *
ln(Complete Portfolio Value) 0.073 0.012 *** -0.186 0.026 *** 2.055 0.388 *** -0.006 0.012
Sophisticated 0.467 0.037 *** -0.001 0.081 -0.779 0.979 -0.136 0.044 ***
Dividend Choice Stock 0.018 0.053 0.248 0.103 ** 1.818 0.875 ** 0.029 0.045
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock -0.068 0.046 0.123 0.074 * 0.586 0.834 0.012 0.040














This table presents the results from regressions of risk-taking behavior on investor perceptions and a set of
control variables. Dependent variables referring to risk-taking behavior are the risky share and the standard
deviation of the daily returns on the complete portfolio. The columns show results of linear panel models.
Standard errors are clustered on the investor level. Variables are defined in Table I. *, **, *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Return Expectation prev. month -0.017 0.019 -0.008 0.004 *
D  Return Expectation -0.010 0.012 -0.002 0.004
Risk Attitude prev. month 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.005 ***
D  Risk Attitude 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.004
Risk Perception prev. month 0.006 0.013 0.014 0.004 ***
D  Risk Perception 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.002 ***
Gender 0.040 0.044 -0.013 0.013
Age 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Account Tenure 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.003 ***
ln(Complete Portfolio Value) -0.019 0.012 -0.040 0.006 ***
Sophisticated -0.051 0.041 0.033 0.010 ***
Dividend Choice Stock 0.219 0.047 *** 0.012 0.013
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock -0.065 0.035 * 0.009 0.009
Traded 0.086 0.031 *** 0.048 0.010 ***
Turnover 0.004 0.006 0.017 0.007 **
Avg. Trade Size/1,000 0.004 0.002 ** 0.001 0.000
Buy-Sell Ratio 0.047 0.018 *** -0.007 0.006
Risky Share 0.085 0.019 ***









Investor Performance – Returns
This table presents the results from regressions of investor returns on investor perceptions and a set of control
variables. Dependent variable is investors’ monthly return on the complete portfolio. The columns show results
of linear panel models. Standard errors are clustered on the investor level. Variables are defined in Table I. *, **,
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Return Expectation prev. month 0.0081 0.0028 *** 0.0081 0.0028 ***
D Return Expectation 0.0177 0.0032 *** 0.0177 0.0032 ***
Risk Attitude prev. month -0.0060 0.0029 ** -0.0060 0.0028 **
D Risk Attitude -0.0025 0.0027 -0.0025 0.0027
Risk Perception prev. month -0.0041 0.0022 * -0.0041 0.0022 *
D Risk Perception -0.0026 0.0017 -0.0026 0.0017
Gender 0.0062 0.0055 0.0062 0.0055
Age -0.0006 0.0002 *** -0.0006 0.0002 ***
Account Tenure -0.0002 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0014
ln(Complete Portfolio Value) 0.0185 0.0029 *** 0.0185 0.0029 ***
Sophisticated -0.0243 0.0064 *** -0.0243 0.0064 ***
Dividend Choice Stock -0.0046 0.0078 -0.0045 0.0078
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock 0.0003 0.0046 0.0002 0.0046
Traded -0.0207 0.0050 *** -0.0207 0.0050 ***
Turnover -0.0088 0.0030 *** -0.0088 0.0030 ***
Avg. Trade Size/1,000 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005
Buy-Sell Ratio -0.0125 0.0041 *** -0.0124 0.0041 ***
Risky Share -0.0342 0.0102 *** -0.0342 0.0102 ***
Return prev. month 0.0014 0.0058











Investor Performance – Modified Sharpe Ratios
This table presents the results from regressions of investor modified Sharpe ratios on investor perceptions and a
set of control variables. Dependent variable is the monthly modified Sharpe ratio of the complete portfolio. The
columns show results of linear panel models. Standard errors are clustered on the investor level. Variables are
defined in Table I. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Return Expectation prev. month 0.032 0.007 *** 0.032 0.007 ***
D  Return Expectation 0.045 0.007 *** 0.045 0.007 ***
Risk Attitude prev. month -0.015 0.006 ** -0.015 0.006 **
D  Risk Attitude -0.011 0.006 * -0.011 0.006 *
Risk Perception prev. month -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005
D  Risk Perception 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
Gender -0.004 0.017 -0.004 0.017
Age -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Account Tenure 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003
ln(Complete Portfolio Value) 0.027 0.006 *** 0.027 0.006 ***
Sophisticated -0.041 0.014 *** -0.041 0.014 ***
Dividend Choice Stock 0.003 0.016 0.004 0.016
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock -0.005 0.011 -0.005 0.011
Traded -0.004 0.013 -0.003 0.013
Turnover -0.013 0.005 ** -0.013 0.005 **
Avg. Trade Size/1,000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Buy-Sell Ratio -0.038 0.010 *** -0.037 0.010 ***
Risky Share -0.028 0.014 ** -0.028 0.014 **
Mod. Sharpe Ratio prev. month 0.00004 0.000002 ***











Descriptive Statistics for Crisis Subperiods
This table presents summary statistics for the brokerage account and survey data for three subperiods. Within each respective subperiod, the monthly variable values are
averaged. Descriptive statistics are based on investors sorted into quintiles according to their modified Sharpe ratio achieved in September–October 2008. In this table, the
fraction sophisticated investors refers to the percentage of investors in each particular month that traded an option or futures contract at least once. Variables are defined in
Table I.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Return Expectation Centered mean -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.24 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.25 -0.18 0.02 -0.16 0.12 0.17
Risk Attitude Centered mean 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.19 0.06 0.02 -0.16 -0.07 0.21 -0.05 0.11 -0.11 -0.17
Risk Perception Centered mean 0.36 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.40 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.22
Gender 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06
Age mean 50.25 50.66 50.78 50.12 50.26 50.25 50.66 50.78 50.12 50.26 50.25 50.66 50.78 50.12 50.26
Account Tenure mean 3.52 3.07 3.22 2.98 3.43 3.52 3.07 3.22 2.98 3.43 3.52 3.07 3.22 2.98 3.43
Complete Portfolio Value € mean 45,597 57,512 54,179 73,228 95,587 26,190 39,380 41,269 60,701 73,432 20,320 30,435 34,708 54,375 64,758
Complete Portfolio Value € median 12,333 16,082 21,945 23,799 19,438 6,510 11,154 16,610 21,628 17,921 5,395 9,250 14,317 19,078 15,080
Fraction Sophisticated 0.36 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.40 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.22
Fraction Traded 0.62 0.51 0.40 0.35 0.42 0.74 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.33 0.36 0.41
Trades (Traders) mean 9.50 7.68 6.81 7.01 8.88 11.47 10.28 6.66 6.49 13.31 10.67 9.13 6.82 7.13 11.69
Trades (Traders) median 4.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 5.00
Volume € (Traders) mean 41,499 21,895 27,901 36,864 45,776 53,899 25,879 25,605 29,271 92,978 27,765 18,339 20,743 35,732 43,332
Volume € (Traders) median 7,275 5,195 4,692 5,005 9,267 8,888 5,028 4,232 3,910 10,674 5,827 3,571 3,256 4,495 7,707
Turnover (Traders) mean 1.80 0.65 0.67 0.49 1.15 3.31 1.01 0.55 0.51 2.07 2.48 1.33 0.78 0.68 1.29
Turnover (Traders) median 0.56 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.33 1.20 0.29 0.21 0.14 0.46 0.76 0.30 0.17 0.16 0.35
Avg. Trade Size € mean 4,006 3,649 3,179 3,737 7,527 3,996 2,652 2,629 3,633 7,510 2,474 2,032 2,457 3,481 4,248
Buy-Sell Ratio (Traders) mean 0.05 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.38 0.46 0.46 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.20 0.13
Risky Share mean 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.58 0.52 0.90 0.85 0.76 0.55 0.44 0.84 0.85 0.76 0.58 0.48
Std(Complete Portfolio Return) mean 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.49 0.28 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.11
Complete Portfolio Return mean -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.38 -0.23 -0.16 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Modified Sharpe Ratio mean 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.34 -0.21 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.25 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.26
Peformance Quintiles Conditional on September/October Modified Sharpe Ratio Ranking




Investor Performance September–October 2008 – Modified Sharpe Ratios
This table presents the results from regressions of investor modified Sharpe ratios on investor perceptions and a
set of control variables for three subperiods. Dependent variable is the average modified Sharpe ratio of
investors’ complete portfolios in September–October 2008. The columns show results of OLS models. Within
each respective subperiod, the monthly variable values are averaged. For these regressions, sophisticated
investors refer to investors that in each particular month traded an option or futures contract at least once.




Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Mean Return Expectation Centered -0.003 0.010 0.022 0.006 *** -0.003 0.013
Mean Risk Attitude Centered 0.010 0.008 -0.003 0.004 0.023 0.009 **
Mean Risk Perception Centered 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.005 -0.015 0.010
Gender -0.034 0.027 -0.011 0.018 -0.021 0.034
Age 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Account Tenure 0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.009 0.005 *
Mean ln(Complete Portfolio Value) 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.004 *** 0.018 0.007 ***
Mean Sophisticated -0.090 0.034 *** -0.035 0.016 ** -0.049 0.039
Dividend Choice Stock -0.034 0.020 * 0.000 0.014 -0.021 0.026
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock 0.007 0.017 -0.020 0.012 * -0.010 0.022
Mean Traded -0.059 0.029 ** -0.037 0.016 ** -0.003 0.038
Mean Turnover -0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.005
Mean Avg. Trade Size/1,000 0.005 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 0.009 0.005 **
Mean Buy-Sell Ratio 0.025 0.033 -0.012 0.014 -0.031 0.051
Mean Risky Share -0.122 0.017 *** -0.109 0.012 *** -0.090 0.022 ***
Mean Mod. Sharpe Ratio 0.169 0.041 *** -0.071 0.062















Sample Differences Between Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents
This table presents the monthly differences in means between respondents and non-respondents. Variables are defined in Table I. *, **, *** denote statistical significant
differences in means between respondents and non-respondents at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
Gender -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Age -0.19 1.13 1.48 ** 2.00 *** 3.36 *** 2.99 *** 1.83 ** 2.51 *** 2.85 *** 2.96 *** 4.26 *** 3.52 ***
Account Tenure -0.18 * -0.10 0.09 -0.04 0.08 0.07 0.21 ** 0.24 ** 0.27 ** 0.36 *** 0.51 *** 0.34 ***
Complete Portfolio Value € -766 -2,069 -1,987 2,854 6,420 4,583 -3,769 5,254 -3,308 3,226 -641 -4,000
Fraction Sophisticated 0.04 0.05 * 0.06 ** 0.05 * 0.07 *** 0.06 ** -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 ** 0.03 0.02
Fraction Traded 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 ** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.04
Trades (Traders) 1.69 * -1.10 0.43 -1.65 -0.93 -0.16 0.53 -0.18 -1.08 0.91 1.72 -0.21
Volume € (Traders) 18,360 -12,540 ** -4,270 -17,953 ** -14,135 * -18,626 ** 10,091 -478 -1,693 9,793 7,300 -2,674
Turnover (Traders) 0.50 ** -0.15 0.24 -0.19 -0.44 * -0.39 0.44 0.47 -0.30 -0.34 0.17 0.64
Risky Share 0.02 0.05 ** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04
Std(Complete Portfolio Return) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Complete Portfolio Return 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 ** -0.02 * -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00





















Apr08 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09
Mean turnover traders (left) Median turnover traders (left)
Fraction traded (left) AEX monthly return (right)
Figure 1. Trading Behavior – Fraction of Investors that Traded and Turnover. AEX return is the total

















Apr08 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09
Mean volume - buy (left) Median volume - buy (left) Mean volume - sell (left)
Median volume - sell (left) AEX monthly return (right)
Figure 2. Trading Behavior – Volume per Investor (Traders). AEX return is the total return of the Dutch











Apr08 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09
Mean investor risky portf. return Median investor risky portf. return
Mean investor complete portf. return Median investor complete portf. return
AEX monthly return
Figure 3. Investor Performance – Investors’ Monthly Returns. Investor returns refer to the returns on the
risky portfolio (excluding cash) or the complete portfolio (including cash). All returns are depicted in monthly







Apr08 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09
Mean investor realized risky portf. volatility Median investor realized risky portf. volatility
Mean investor realized complete portf. volatility Median investor realized complete portf. volatility
AEX realized volatility
Figure 4. Risk-Taking Behavior – Investors’ Monthly Return Volatility. Investor realized volatility is
calculated based on the daily returns on the risky portfolio (excluding cash) or complete portfolio (including
cash). AEX realized volatility is calculated for each month based on the daily total returns of the AEX index. All


















Apr08 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09
Mean Risky Share (left) Median Risky Share (left) AEX monthly return (right)
Figure 5. Risk-Taking Behavior – Investors’ Risky Share. AEX return is the total return of the Dutch stock





















Apr08 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09










Figure 6. Return Expectations. Return expectations are measured on a 7-point Likert scale (see Table III);
shown is the sample mean. A small value indicates low return expectations, whereas a large value indicates high
return expectations. Asterisks depict significant differences between the means for subsequent month pairs for
return expectations based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%,






















Apr08 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09








Figure 7. Risk Attitude and Risk Perception. Risk attitude and risk perception about investment prospects are
measured  on  a  7-point  Likert  scale  (see  Table  III);  shown  is  the  sample  mean.  For  illustrative  purposes,  risk
perception is shown on an inverted scale. A small value indicates a risk averse risk attitude or high risk
perceived, whereas a large value indicates a less risk averse risk attitude or low risk perceived. * and + depict
significant differences between the means for subsequent month pairs for risk attitude or risk perception based
on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. * (+), ** (++), *** (+++) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and










1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Apr 08 - Aug 08 Sept 08 - Oct 08 Nov 08 - Mar 09
Figure 8. Crisis Performance – Investors’ Modified Sharpe Ratios. Numbers from 1 to 5 on the x-axis
indicate performance ranking quintiles of investors based on their mean modified Sharpe ratios in September–
October 2008. Shown are the sample means for each modified Sharpe ratio quintile in a given observation
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1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Apr 08 - Aug 08 Sept 08 - Oct 08 Nov 08 - Mar 09
Panel D: Risky Share
Figure 9. Crisis Performance – Investors’ Trading Behavior. Numbers from 1 to 5 on the x-axes in Panels
A–D indicate performance ranking quintiles of investors based on their mean modified Sharpe ratios in
September–October 2008. Shown are the sample means for each trading indicator per performance quintile in a








1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Apr 08 - Aug 08 Sept 08 - Oct 08 Nov 08 - Mar 09







1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Apr 08 - Aug 08 Sept 08 - Oct 08 Nov 08 - Mar 09







1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Apr 08 - Aug 08 Sept 08 - Oct 08 Nov 08 - Mar 09
Panel C: Risk Perception Centered
Figure 10. Crisis Performance – Investors’ Perceptions. Numbers from 1 to 5 on the x-axes in Panels A–C
indicate performance ranking quintiles of investors based on their mean modified Sharpe ratios in September–
October 2008. Return expectation, risk attitude, and risk perception are measured on a 7-point Likert scale (see
Table III) and centered by their month-specific means. A small value indicates low return expectations (more
risk averse risk attitudes, low risk perceived), whereas a large value indicates high return expectations (less risk
averse risk attitudes, high risk perceived).
